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How does Identity shape China’s foreign policy 
choices in the South China Sea? 
 
Introduction 
Over 5 trillion dollars of global trade pass through the South China Sea every year, 
making it an extremely important region for functioning of the global economy, and thus 
international stability and security. The People’s Republic of China, Malaysia, Brunei, 
Vietnam, The Philippines, and Taiwan all border this key body of water and are maritime 
neighbours with competing claims to various land features. These competing claims have 
recently been the focus of growing international attention and concern due mostly to the land 
reclamation being carried out by China in the Spartly islands and the subsequent construction 
of facilities which may have military use.1 While China is not the only state reclaiming land in 
the sea, it has gone the farthest in attempting to substantiate its claims, causing international 
alarm as a result. This concern comes not only from states in the region with direct claims but 
also from a number of European countries, the United States, and more recently Japan, who 
worry that the militarization of the South China Sea would create a dangerous flashpoint with 
a rising China. The United States and some of its partners have also expressed concern with 
what they see as a threat to ‘Freedom of Navigation’ within the South China Sea, which would 
undoubtedly have far reaching global repercussions for global trade, as well as international 
security and stability. However, among the different disputes and disputants, the one between 
China and The Philippines poses the biggest risk of escalation. This dispute stems over the 
sovereignty of Scarborough Shoal and several other features in the Spartlys. Although, the 
dispute dates back several decades, it did not become a salient issue until the mid-1990s when 
it was internationalised. Since, there have been several instances which saw tensions rise 
dangerously high, the most recent being the result of the July 2016 ruling from the arbitral 
tribunal in The Hague regarding the dispute. The current situation as it stands has led several 
experts and think tanks to the conclusion that ‘The risk of conflict in the South China Sea is 
significant’2, making it extremely important to understand the positions of China, the US and 
the Philippines on the current disputes to ensure that the probability of conflict is reduced as 
much as possible. The US position is important given its policy in the SCS as well as the fact 
                                                          
1 P. Jeremy, L. E. Carol, L. Gordon, ‘China's President Pledges No Militarization in Disputed Islands.’ ( Wall 
Street Journal, 25 Sept. 2015. Web. 01 Apr. 2016.) 
2 Glaser, Bonnie Bonnie. "Armed Clash in the South China Sea." Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 
14 (2012): n. pag. Apr. 2012. Web. 27 Sept. 2016. P.1 
that it is a treaty ally of The Philippines. While the current US position is currently portrayed 
as one based on The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which 
supports freedom of navigation and a normative based order, China’s claims and ultimate goals 
within the region are less well understood. China claims that the South China Seas has been 
‘Chinese territory since ancient times’3 and sees it as a sovereignty issue, expressly rejecting 
claims that any of its actions are expansionary. With such divergent views on the issue it is 
crucial to understand both sides’ arguments, and while the position of the United States may 
seem clear and logical as a result of its legalistic approach, it fails to understand the roots and 
importance of the Chinese claim. Furthermore, not only does it neglect to understand the 
potential historical validity of the claims, but it also fails to understand the historical context 
which has shaped the Chinese perspective on the issue. 
The Philippine case is interesting given its evolution since the mid-20th century when 
the first claims from Manila were recorded. The result has been an ebb and flow of tensions in 
the relationship between Manila and Beijing at various points, depending on the status of the 
dispute. The relationship has been complicated further since it was internationalised in the 
1990s as well as because the Philippines is a US treaty ally. Therefore, Beijing interprets any 
hostile actions from Manila as emanating from Washington, who is not only seem as an 
illegitimate actor in the region but one that seeks to contain a rising China.  This presents a 
complex interaction between the varying interpretations of the dispute with the US taking a 
legalistic norms approach which the Philippines as subscribed to a certain extent and China 
who sees it as an issue of territorial integrity. If this is indeed seen as a sovereignty issue, then 
from a Chinese perspective the actions it ‘has taken in the South China Sea are legitimate 
reactions to safeguard its territorial sovereignty’ and it risks exacerbating the situation by 
conducting provocative military operations in the area for a number of reasons. First, these may 
bring back memories of imperial encroachments into Chinese territory similar to those suffered 
during the ‘century of humiliation’. Second, taking the previous reason into account, any action 
may result in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) being forced to respond militarily or risk 
losing legitimacy. This is because the CCP has used China’s century of humiliation in order to 
build a historical narrative in which the exploitation of China ‘ends with the salvation of China 
in 1949 when Mao and the CCP finally liberated the country and founded the PRC.’4 Following 
                                                          
3 "Exclusive Q&A with Chinese President Xi Jinping." Interview by Reuters.Reuters. N.p., 17 Oct. 2015. Web. 
24 Sept. 2016. 
4 Callahan, William A. China: The Pessoptimist Nation. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010. Print.P.39 
this narrative, it is then evident that any Chinese policy responses would have to adhere to this 
narrative in order to preserve the legitimacy of the ruling party.  
This research will seek to answer the question of how Chinese identity shapes the 
foreign policy options available to the CCP in responding to the contest over the Spartlys vis-
à-vis the Philippines as well as the ‘Freedom of Navigation Operation(FONOP) operations led 
by the United States. It will strive to make a clear link between Chinese Identity creation and 
how this provides the communist party with legitimacy, yet constrains how it is able to respond 
in light of the disputes in the South China Sea. The research will also focus on freedom of 
navigation operations as these are seen as US encroachment in its ‘near-abroad’ both directly 
and as providing support states in the region with which China would otherwise like to 
negotiate bi-laterally5 . It will attempt to draw a direct correlation between actions of the 
Philippines in the Spartlys have impacted policy making in Beijing by being closely tied to 
identity and legitimacy. Finally, the research will attempt to predict how China would react in 
the event of an escalation, either perceived (increased publicity of Philippine claims or 
FONOPs) or actual (such as an incident during a FONOP or hostile action by Manila). It is 
obvious that understanding the Chinese perspective well is essential to successfully avoiding 
an escalation in what is already a conflict prone region. 
Literary Review 
 The literature regarding the South China Sea and the ongoing disputes is extremely 
varied by the very nature of the fact that it involves numerous parties including states, 
intergovernmental organisations such as ASEAN, non-governmental organisations such as the 
Asian Maritime Transparency Initiative…etc. Therefore, it is highly important that we select 
relevant literature which will help us analyse the area of the disputes that this research focuses 
on, namely, FONOPs, the policy choices available to the Chinese Government, and how these 
are shaped by ‘Chinese Identity’. 
Chinese Identity 
 The recent ruling of the UNCLOS in favour of the Philippines and against China was 
seen as the latest ‘humiliation’ of China in the international area by foreign powers. Indeed, 
while ‘the west’ may interpret the anger in response to the ruling as ‘irrational and disruptive’ 
nationalism, Chinese writer Xu, Bijun wrote in the ‘Global Times’(A nationalist Beijing based 
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newspaper) that ‘these instances…reveal the Chinese collective memory of international law’.6 
Xu elaborates and successfully links current proceedings and recent rulings as stemming from 
the same international system that was responsible for ‘unequal treaties and Western 
imperialism’.7  True, that the Global Times is not a complete representation of the media 
landscape as it is more nationalistic that more mainstream sources such as Xinhua or the China 
Daily. However, it provides a vital insight into the position of nationalist elements in Beijing’s 
policy making. While a large majority may dismiss these claims outside of China, including 
policy makers in capitals such as Washington DC, they are not only entirely relevant but indeed 
crucial to understanding the Chinese position in the disputes as well as instrumental in finding 
diplomatic solutions. Callahan argues that the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party 
‘grows out of the history of its revolution against foreign imperialism and domestic 
corruption’. 8  He continues that the revolution against ‘foreign imperialism’ became the 
centrepiece of the CCPs propaganda strategy to legitimise its rule after the Tienanmen square 
protests which Deng Xiaoping saw as a ‘catastrophic failure’ of the propaganda system.9 
Callahan’s point that the narrative of national humiliation was revived after Tienanmen may 
be partly accurate, but it was not created out of thin air. There are numerous incidents in the 
last two centuries of Chinese history that lend themselves to the creation of such a narrative 
and indeed the emergence of such is not completely farfetched when one takes into account 
unequal treaties, foreign concessions, and the Japanese invasion preceding the Second World 
War. China was repeatedly ‘taken advantage of’ beginning with the signing of the Nanjing 
Treaty of 1942 which ended the First Opium War and required the opening of treaty ports as 
well as the cession of Hong Kong. Early in the 20th century China had seen The Russians and 
the Japanese fighting over Manchuria, which was officially a piece of Chinese territory, yet 
were nearly powerless to stop either party and was not even consulted on such matters. The 
end of the First World War brought some degree of hope as the German settlements were 
expected to be returned to the now republican China. However, Mitter argues that the ‘West’s 
supposed desire for international justice and order was yet another sham’ as Germany’s 
possessions were given to Japan.10 This resulted in large numbers of young people to turn to 
‘nationalism, or in some cases Marxism, for salvation’11 Ritter continues later by saying that 
                                                          
6 Xu, Bijun. "Chinese Owe No Apologies for Nationalism." Global Times, 12 Sept. 2016. Web. 21 Sept. 2016. 
7 Ibid 
8 Callahan, William A. China: The Pessoptimist Nation. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010. Print.P.34 
9 Ibid, P.34 
10 Mitter, Rana. A Bitter Revolution: China's Struggle with the Modern World. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2004. Print. 
P.38 
11 Ibid, P.38 
while the rise of communism and nationalist ideas ‘have been treated as aspects of the same 
phenomenon’, it is ‘misleading and unfair to characterise nationalism as simply a second fiddle 
for the all-important rise of communism.’12 Tsu, Jing agrees to a large extent with Ritter that 
looking back at the development of modern nationalism from the ‘late nineteenth century 
through the first four decades of the twentieth century, one sees how the sense of injury 
resurfaces as reason for further ‘defence”13. However, Tsu correctly identifies the correlation 
between nationalism and state ideology in so far as ‘the latter possesses the coercive power to 
reshape and even supersede the former.’14 It is then difficult to contend against the notion that 
while nationalism and the rise of communism may have started as separate forces, the former 
has been co-opted by the latter. This is evident through the dualistic approach taken by 
textbooks in China which to seek ‘legitimise their modern nation by linking it to the 
achievements of an ancient civilisation’ 15  and results in a proud history which has been 
displayed by the party internationally including during the 2008 Beijing Olympics Opening 
Ceremony. More recent history focuses on the narrative of a weak China that has been 
repeatedly humiliated and taken advantage of at the hands of foreigners. The salvation of China 
finally arrives in 1949 ‘when Mao and the CCP..liberated the country and founded the People’s 
Republic of China’.16  Consequently, when we take historical events into account, which are 
already tragic, and view them through the lens of the CCP, it is not unreasonable to anticipate 
the anger of Chinese citizens at the United States. The US is not seen as having a legitimate 
interest in the region other than the exertion of its hegemony, and perhaps a desire to humiliate 
China. 
National humiliation undoubtedly plays an important role in the formation of Chinese 
identity, but as of late there is a nascent idea coming into fashion. Xi Jinping has advanced the 
idea of a Chinese dream since 2012. The definition of this new emerging narrative is ambiguous 
even 4 years after it was first unveiled, yet it presents the possibility of an emerging positive 
narrative that does not rely on victimhood. A song titled ‘Chinese Dream’ defines it as “A 
dream of a strong nation…a dream of a wealthy people”.17 In some senses it does not sound 
dissimilar from the much better known American dream. However, the Chinese dream seems 
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13 Tsu, Jing. Failure, Nationalism, and Literature: The Making of Modern Chinese Identity, 1895-1937. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2005. Print. P.225 
14 Ibid, P.24 
15 Callahan, William A. China: The Pessoptimist Nation. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010. Print.P.14 
16 Ibid, P.39 
17 "Chasing the Chinese Dream." The Economist. The Economist Newspaper, 04 May 2013. Web. 02 Jan. 2017. 
to be one where a nation regains its lost status on the world stage and encourages nationalism 
to some extent.18 This is driven home by Xi’s statements to the military that Chinese dream is 
the same as a ‘strong-army dream’ where the party is obeyed and serves the party’s interests 
which are inseparable to those of the Chinese nation.19 The result may be a more assertive 
policy which is tied to the perception of a strong China on the cusp of being a true global power. 
The intricacies of how this narrative merges into modern Chinese identity will depend on how 
its definition evolves un Xi and its durability thereafter. In the next section the research will 
look at how this identity has historically constrained the policy choices available to the CCP. 
Identity and Policy Choice 
 The narrative of national humiliation has been successfully advanced by the CCP as a 
way to legitimise itself and remain in power as the defender of China and Chinese people from 
‘the west’. It has sought to explain the backwardness of China as a result of western 
obstructionism20 and has extrapolated this into a lesson that all Chinese people must learn, 
which is that ‘a weak country will be bullied and humiliated, and the backward will be 
beaten’.21 Thus, this retelling of history which focuses on blaming outsiders while glossing 
over the shortcomings of the party directly translates into a Chinese identity which is crafted 
to near enough guarantee support for the CCP since those who are against its policies must then 
be anti-China, in favour of a weak China that can be taken advantage of. ‘This binary 
positive/negative rhetoric reduces the complexities of political life to a simplistic zero-sum 
distinction’22 which ensures maximum support as long as the party is seen to be adhering to the 
narrative it has created. It causes serious legitimacy concerns when it is seen to be straying 
from the principles which it claims to advance. Issues, especially those pertaining to foreign 
policy in an increasingly interconnected world are seldom binary, involve multiple parties both 
on the international stage as well as within each state actor itself. Different ministries, interest 
groups, the media and branches of the military are all possible participants which may influence 
the policy of any member state. This makes it very unlikely that all parties will be satisfied 
with policy all the time. One way Beijing may minimise the potential for internal discord is 
what Mertha calls “state framing”, and while the success of this tactic may vary, it is likely to 
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19 "Chasing the Chinese Dream." The Economist. The Economist Newspaper, 04 May 2013. Web. 02 Jan. 2017. 
20 Ibid, P.37 
21 Ibid, P.44 
22 Ibid, P.40 
be quite strong when ‘backed by the state’s coercive apparatus’.23 The state may attempt to 
maximise its influence of the framing of disputes in the South China Sea by trying to limit the 
effect of ‘policy entrepreneurs’’ ability to ‘shop around for potential supporters’. 24 
Nevertheless, while Beijing is capable of exerting substantial control over official media such 
as government channels and newspapers, focusing only on these ‘underscores media 
sophistication’25 as it does not take into account the large amounts of information shared by 
netizens on online platforms such as ‘Weibo’, ‘Weixin’, as video sharing sites such as ‘Youku’ 
and their ability to ‘undermine Beijing’s ability to maintain its monopoly on spin.’26 As a 
consequence, decision makers must always ensure that they make decisions consistent with the 
basis for the legitimacy of the CCP. This is evident in recent events which tested the party’s 
ability to control the narrative when it comes to international issues, contrary to the outside 
perception which regards the CCP as having hegemony domestic propaganda and 
nationalism. 27  This simplification of the interactions between the policy makers and the 
Chinese people who, though educated with a certain narrative are not obliged to adhere to it. It 
leads to outsiders dismissing the emotions of the Chinese people whose beliefs and interaction 
with the outside world through direct experience and state as well as social media help shape 
their opinions and leads to an ever-evolving perception of what is China and what it means to 
be Chinese. The more extreme elements within society may be especially involved and 
challenge the CCPs ‘hegemony over Chinese nationalist discourse’, placing ‘tremendous 
pressure on those who decide the PRC’s foreign policy.’28 This effectively constrains the 
number of policy choices available to Beijing without risking its legitimacy. In effect, the 
awakening of the more nationalist elements within society prevents Beijing from negotiating 
over territory as it has in the past.29 Some prominent examples are: first is the during the mid-
air collision of a US spy plane in 2001 resulting in the presumed death of the pilot of the 
Chinese aircraft. The US’s plane landed in Hainan and its crew were detained by the PRC for 
10 days until the US expressed regret over the incident. While the PRC likely had no desire to 
escalate the situation it could not simply be seen to release the crew without any consequences, 
as that could be interpreted as capitulation to the US. Second, a few years after the spy plane 
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Process." The China Quarterly 200 (2009): P.999 
24 Ibid, P.998 
25 Ibid, P.998 
26 Ibid, P.998 
27 Gries, Peter Hays. China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy. Berkeley: U of California, 2004. 
Print.P.17 
28 Ibid,P.136 
29 Callahan, William A. China: The Pessoptimist Nation. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010. Print.P.112 
incident, ‘the CCP became worried at the enthusiasm with which the anti-American agenda 
was taken up by some activists’ in opposition to the 2003 war in Iraq30. Some of its participants 
found themselves ‘under official surveillance, despite their strongly nationalist position.’31 
Analysis 
 The following section will analyse the link between identity and policy choices. It will 
do so first by outlining the general context of the situation in the cases which are within the 
realm of the research. It will begin with an overview analysis of China’s claims and move on 
to how these overlap with the claims of the Philippines and provide a brief background to US 
policy in the South China Sea. The research will then dive further and analyse the interplay 
between the case of the Philippines’ actions, US policy and Chinese identity. Each case will be 
analysed given its specific circumstances before continuing to attempt to draw on similarities 
between each and whether the information can lead to better policy making.  
Analysing China’s claims and policy  
 Historical analysis and context play extremely important parts in understanding and 
working towards a resolution of the conflict. While the modern-day conflict involves the PRC, 
its claim is based on being a direct descendant of a Chinese nation of with thousands of years 
of history. Since the PRC and by extension, the CCP see themselves as a continuation of 
Chinese civilisation they assert ‘historical’ claim over the area going back as early as 200BC 
when the islands were used as ‘shelter or other purposes’ by Chinese ‘navigators and 
fishermen.’32  It is contentious whether these are enough grounds to claim sovereignty over the 
features and the sea, especially given that occupation was not ‘effective or permanent.’33  The 
early 20th century saw expeditions to the area led by admiral Li Zhun, but the area remained 
largely free of competing claims, well past the middle of the 20th century. The 1956 ‘discovery’ 
of features in the SCS by Philippine citizen Tomas Cloma in 1956 drew opposition by China, 
but there was no action forthcoming other than the stating that it was part of Chinese territory. 
The Philippine government in response claimed that the islands had become ‘res nullius’ once 
Japan renounced sovereignty over in the San Francisco treaty of 195134 and were therefore 
                                                          
30 Mitter, Rana. A Bitter Revolution: China's Struggle with the Modern World. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2004. Print. 
P.299 
31 Ibid, P.299 
32 Lee, Lai To. China and the South China Sea Dialogues. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999. Print.P9 
33 Ibid,P10 
34 Zhao, Hong. "Sino-Philippine Relations: Moving Beyond South China Sea Dispute?" The Journal of East 
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open to economic to nationals of any country under international law. 35 There was no further 
action by any party other than stating the positions above. The occupation ended when Taipei 
used force to drive Cloma’s men out of the area.36  
  The PRC position remained that the Philippine occupation was illegal and dismissed 
Manila’s argument of res nullius as it had never ‘expressed any intention to relinquish 
sovereignty over those features.’37 While Chinese presence undoubtedly declined in during the 
republican period and leading into the Second World War, China’s fundamental historical 
claim is that prior to the arrival of imperial powers in the SCS, the islands and ‘their 
surrounding areas were part of a Chinese domain’38 Therefore, ‘the relationship of history to 
the present’ presents itself as the key issue in assessing which state possesses sovereign rights 
over the features and their surroundings.39 It is important to note that the assertion that the 
PRC’s claims are historical directly results in them becoming part of the CCP’s ‘fight against 
foreign encroachment’40, which it uses in part to legitimise its rule while at the same time 
constraining the options available to resolve the dispute with the Philippines. There can be no 
solution to the current disputes which lead to reduction of what is at least perceived to be 
sovereign Chinese territory as this would instantly de-legitimise the CCP as the protector of 
the Chinese nation. Some have suggested that the solution would be for claimants, in this case 
the Philippines to accept Chinese sovereignty to allow negotiations and joint development of 
resources to move forward.41 
 
Overlapping claims of China and the Philippines 
 This Paper focuses on one of the main areas of concern in the SCS disputes is that 
between the PRC and the Philippines. China has repeatedly claimed that it has historical 
sovereignty over the SCS given a long history extending through history, which nullifies any 
competing claims made by other actors. ‘The Spartly Islands had become a part of China even 
before Magellan discovered the Philippines’42 according to the People’s daily in response to 
                                                          
35 Chi-kin, Lo. China's Policy Towards Territorial Disputes: The Case of the South China Sea Islands. N.p.: 
Routledge, 1989. Print.P141 
36 Ibid,P.141 
37 Wu, Shicun, and Keyuan Zou. Arbitration concerning the South China Sea: Philippines versus China. 
Farnham, Surrey, England: Ashgate Limited, 2016. Print.P.16 
38 Ibid,P.27 
39 Ibid,P.47 
40 Ibid,P.16 
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42 Chi-kin, Lo. China's Policy Towards Territorial Disputes: The Case of the South China Sea Islands. N.p.: 
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the Cloma’s ‘discovery’ of the features in 1956.43 Yet, there was no official claim by the 
Philippine government until July 10th, 1971, when president Marcos issued a statement 
‘articulated an official claim by the Philippines to part of the Spartlys.’44 Given that these 
claims are relatively recent it would not be completely unreasonable at least acknowledge the 
possible validity of the PRC’s position that it exerts historical sovereignty over the Spartlys or 
the Nansha islands as they are called in Chinese.  
 The dispute between the Philippines and the PRC over the Spartlys has the most 
potential to be the most disruptive to international peace. Manila is a US treaty ally and as such 
raises the real prospect of great power conflict should there be any miscalculation on the part 
of any party. This danger is further exacerbated by Beijing’s refusal to acknowledge that 
Washington possesses a legitimate interest in the region which is instead perceived to be an 
attempt to counterbalance a rising China.45 There has been a long held belief in Beijing’s policy 
circles that Manila’s interest in the Spartlys has been ‘encouraged by the US.’46 Relations 
between Manila and Beijing have depended on their inclination or lack thereof towards 
confrontation with either Washington and/or Beijing, which we are able to observe through the 
lens of changing relations between administrations in the Philippines. One only has to look at 
the very different approaches taken by the Aquino administration between 2010-2016 and the 
previous Arroyo administration to gauge the impact they have on relations with both the US 
and the PRC. Arroyo’s administration enjoyed broadly positive relations with Beijing in spite 
of the SCS disputes and was able to reach an agreement the ‘Conduct of Parties in the South 
China Sea’ in 2002.’47 While, Aquino oversaw the strengthening of ties with Washington, 
including agreements to increase its military presence for the first time since 1992.48 This along 
with decision initiate arbitration over the Spartlys have resulted in the escalation of tensions in 
the SCS and turned it into a ‘potential flashpoint’49 
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Chinese Policy and Identity in the Philippines case 
The Philippines first officially claimed part of the Spartlys in July, 1971 by employing 
the argument of proximity.50 It claims that it is part of the same Philippine continental shelf 
and therefore part of the Philippine archipelago.51  This was the official beginning of the 
territorial disputes between Manila and Beijing. Through the decades, the level of tensions has 
varied considerably. Previous instances of escalating tensions between the Philippines and 
China have been preceded by a publication of the dispute in some way either by Manila, the 
US, or International bodies in the case of UNCLOS. This elicits a Chinese response which 
reaffirms its position and frames it as an issue pertaining to territorial Integrity. Although, this 
may go counter to the actual wishes of policy makers in Beijing, they must ensure they are not 
seen as weak and compromising as this would risk delegitimising the CCP. The legitimacy of 
CCP rule is in part based on rescuing China from the century of humiliation where it was forced 
to cede territory and sign unequal treaties, therefore it would be immediately problematic to be 
seen to renege on this core pillar of its legitimacy.52 Even so, this does not mean that it seeks 
conflict. Although the CCP is often portrayed as a belligerent in the region unwilling to 
compromise, it has previously sought to resolve territorial disputes through negotiation rather 
than conflict even when this results in the loss of territory.53  The portrayal of Beijing as 
uncompromising is mistaken and dangerous as it does not take into account the particular 
environment on which the CCP relies on to maintain power, it is not opposed to compromised 
and has actually been in favour of shelving disputes in favour of developing relations in the 
past. 54  What it must guard against is risk of delegitimization resulting from public 
denunciations which question the sovereignty of the features. The policy regarding how these 
claims are enforced has evolved depending on the administration in power.  
President Marcos, made the first official claim through both a presidential decree and 
the use of the military. Beijing demanded that Manila ‘must immediately stop its encroachment 
upon China’s territory’55 in response to the publication of a presidential decree but did not 
respond to ‘actual troop occupation’ as it was routine for Manila to neither confirm nor deny 
news reports of occupation of the islands which reduced friction with the PRC.56 Manila’s 
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refusal to provide confirmation limited publication of the incident and helped to limit 
objections from Beijing, as it was not interested in an international confrontation during the 
tumultuous period of the Cultural Revolution. In contrast, the CCP was compelled to respond 
to ‘public, official proclamation of Philippines’ sovereignty’57 to maintain its legitimacy which 
derived from standing up to foreign imperialism. Mao could not be the saviour of the nation 
and then be seen to concede an inch of territory. Accordingly, the policy of responding to public 
claims suited both Beijing and Manila and 1975 saw the establishment of official relations 
between the Philippines and the PRC, serving as further evidence that both sides were willing 
to overlook the dispute at least in part to further ties.  
Aquino, who succeeded Marcos followed a similar policy of prioritising relations over the 
disputes. There was agreement between Beijing and Manila in 1988 that the disputes over the 
Spartlys would be put aside for ‘the time being’ and China no intention to challenge the 
Philippine claim until the mid-1990s.58  Following the period of relative calm which had 
endured in bi-lateral relations until this point, would come the beginning of a more tumultuous 
era. It is important to note that relative calm prevailed while the disputes were in large part 
‘frozen’. This suited Manila who surely would not fare well in a conflict with a superior 
military power as well as Beijing who could focus on other aspects of bilateral relations if the 
narrative it had created was not challenged. The calm would not last long past the changes 
ushered in by the period at end of the Cold War until the early 1990s. There seem to be two 
main causes for the change. First, the collapse of the Soviet Union and its repercussions on 
international society were front and centre for policy makers in Beijing, especially following 
the Tiananmen square protests. Deng Xiaoping, conscious of global events perceived that the 
party would go the same way as other communist states due to an irreversible crisis of 
legitimacy. The long-term response was to overhaul the CCPs propaganda system and restore 
the narrative of ‘national humiliation’.59 The aim was to legitimise the party’s rule while 
framing China’s weakness as a direct consequence of actions by the west to constrain it, while 
at the same time portraying itself as the vehicle to restore its former greatness.60 In this narrative 
which was successfully advanced through education and the publishing of ‘national 
humiliation’ textbooks, China is always portrayed as an often helpless victim to foreign 
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aggression.61 The narrative that the CCP has created has been taken up by the people and now 
acts as a constraint on conflict resolution as it limits the number of acceptable outcomes. 
Beijing must be careful not to be accused of committing treason by surrendering Chinese 
territory, just as it was in 2004, when it reached an agreement regarding islands ‘at the 
confluence of the Amur and Ussuri rivers.’62 It is precisely for this reason that the shelving of 
disputes to ensure they do not become potential flashpoints is such an attractive option for 
Beijing. This brings us to the second significant event, this time in Manila. President Ramos, 
who succeeded the Aquino administration, moved to internationalise the dispute. 63  By 
reaffirming its claims with the international community, Manila, forced Beijing to take a public 
stance on the disputes and led to several actions from both sides which would exacerbate 
tensions. The implications of diminished trust was laid bare when the Philippines revealed that 
China had secretly built structures on Mischief reef, which is within the area claimed by 
Manila. 64  The situation escalated further when the Philippines retaliated by destroying 
territorial markers and arresting ‘Chinese fishermen for poaching.’65 Beijing was forced to 
respond to these very public acts and labelled the actions as ‘provocative’ and declared that it 
would use international law, including UNCLOS to examine the disputes.  
  With the disputes now certainly internationalised, Beijing could not retreat from its 
claims without risking backlash from more nationalist elements within China and instead 
sought to institute initiatives to prevent further escalation and the establishment of mechanisms 
to limit conflict. This is consistent with the CCP narrative of a peaceful China that does not 
seek international conflict unless it is unavoidable to defend the nation. The outcome was an 
‘eight-point code of conduct’ which marked the beginning of ‘a more active role of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN)’ and led to the ‘2002 Declaration on the 
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.’ 66  The management of the conflict through 
confidence building measures rather than focusing on the disputes 67  allowed relations to 
stabilise and was in the interest of both parties, neither of which sought to escalate the conflict. 
This environment continued during Arroyo’s presidency, and led to a commitment to ‘maintain 
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peace and stability’ during Hu Jintao’s 2005 visit.68 The exchange of high level visits led to the 
Joint Maritime Seismic Understanding (JMSU) which promoted the idea of joint development 
first discussed by Aquino and Deng Xiaoping in 1988.69 While this may seem like a generous 
offer and a pragmatic approach, it depended on ‘the premise of admitting China’s sovereignty 
over’ the features,70 once again making it abundantly clear that Beijing would not compromise 
on this point.  
 The most recent tensions can be traced to the administration of Aquino III, who is seen 
to have abandoned bi-lateral negotiations preferred by Beijing.71 The Philippines under Aquino 
III has attempted to rally ASEAN to one common position, and it drawn closer to the US72 
which Beijing does not recognise as having a legitimate interest in the region. The Philippine 
position was influenced by Beijing’s ‘submission of a “9-dash line” claim to the South China 
Sea in 2009’ and increased military spending as evidence that the PRC was growing more 
assertive in the region. The April 2012 incident which resulted in the loss of Scarborough Shoal, 
further reaffirmed the perception in Manila that there had been a clear change and Beijing 
would now pursue a more assertive foreign policy. This played a significant role in its decision 
to challenge the PRC under article 287, annex VII of UNCLOS.73 The Philippines sought to 
challenge not only what it sees violations of its sovereignty, but the validity of the ‘nine-dash 
line’.  Given the great disparities between the Philippines and the PRC it is unlikely Manila 
would challenge Beijing without ‘some measure of US backing’, likely as part of an 
arrangement to highlight China’s threat74 and to further Washington’s policy goals in Asia. 
 The filing under UNCLOS presented a grave threat to the status quo of how disputes 
had been handled. The CCP could no longer rely on the conflict keeping a low profile and carry 
on relations as usual given this very public challenge. Its response was refusal to participate in 
the process in the hope of de-legitimising it both in the eyes of domestic and international 
audiences. Beijing refused to submit documents to UNCLOS and it went further by alleging 
that the 2006 declaration with the Philippines cover this dispute and that the case concerns 
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issues of sovereignty, ‘preventing the tribunal from asserting its jurisdiction.’ 75  Beijing 
maintains that the ‘essence of the subject-matter of the arbitration is territorial sovereignty over 
several maritime features in the SCS, which is beyond the scope of the convention.’76 This 
interpretation is not wholly unreasonable as it is nearly impossible to decide on the claims 
without first clarifying the sovereignty issue over the contested islands.77 Beijing has sought to 
delegitimise the proceedings in order to maintain its own legitimacy. Even accepting the case 
would suggest that there are grounds for a challenge and is the antithesis of the official narrative 
in which the features have historically been Chinese territory and their sovereignty is beyond 
refute. Maintaining this narrative is pivotal to upholding the legitimacy of the CCP and from 
preventing more nationalistic elements from influencing policy. It is unlikely that Beijing 
would actively seek conflict as it is aware that this would cause extensive damage to its 
development and potentially end CCP rule if it lost. Nonetheless, it faces serious pressure from 
nationalists who command followings and pressure the CCP to retaliate to competing claims 
and hostile actions. Because the CCP ‘depends upon its ability to stay on top of popular 
nationalist demands’78, efforts to further internationalise the dispute by involving other actors 
such as the US or UNCLOS significantly lessens its ability to compromise and increases the 
chance for escalation by empowering more nationalist elements within China. 
Chinese Identity and US policy in the South China Sea 
 The presence of the US in the area is no surprise given the large amount of international 
trade which sails through the SCS as well as the presence of regional allies such as Japan, and 
of course the Philippines. US involvement is framed in a legalistic manner where it is a benign 
hegemon merely trying to maintain freedom of navigation and ensure that sea lanes remain 
open to all. Most Southeast Asian states, including the Philippines see Washington’s presence 
as helpful in helping to counter-balance growing Chinese military might. However, Beijing 
and the CCP does not subscribe to this view and is loath to recognise the US as having a 
legitimate interest in the region. Nationalists within Beijing go further and paint an aggressive 
anti-China US policy attempting to encircle the PRC and prevent it from regional leadership in 
its near abroad.  
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The official position in Washington is that it takes no sides on the sovereignty of the 
features.79 The US has claimed that the ‘pivot to Asia was not intended to punish or contain 
China’80 but it is unlikely that this is taken at face value. US policy in the region has played an 
antagonistic role vis-à-vis the PRC since the 2011 pivot and its support for the Philippines81 
and resulted in an escalation of tensions rather than negotiations which aim to resolve the 
disputes. While, the situation seems to be evolving given President Duterte’s policy change, 
there is still significant tension that has built up in the region. The Philippine’s use of UNCLOS 
rather than help the issue move towards resolution, did quite the opposite. By making the 
dispute into a high-profile case, it forced the CCP to address it within the domestic arena. The 
portrayal of Beijing of an international ‘outlaw’ within a system perceived to favour the US 
was further confirmation that the system is hostile to a rising China. Within the zero-sum 
narrative of national humiliation this was another loss of face at the hands of ‘Western 
imperialism.’82 Given that the CCP obtains a significant part of its legitimacy as the saviour of 
the nation from western imperialism, such publicity constrains the policy options with which 
it may responds without compromising its mandate to rule. 
 In conjunction to the UNCLOS case and subsequent unfavourable ruling, the US has 
resumed what it calls ‘Freedom of Navigation Operations’(FONOPS) in the SCS. These 
operations are usually conducted by the US Navy in various parts of the world with the stated 
aim ensure that international waters remain open to all, though they are usually conducted in a 
‘a low-key fashion.’83 In contrast to the normal execution of FONOPS the resumption of these 
operations in the SCS during the second half of 2015 was anything but low key. It was debated 
in the US congress, and widely publicised in US and international media prior their actual 
occurrence. Similarly with the UNCLOS and Philippine dispute, the more an incident is 
publicized and internationalised the stronger the response it will elicit from policy makers in 
Beijing. The official response came in the form of a protest and accusing the US of stirring up 
trouble in the region, but it was the unofficial response which raises much more cause for 
concern. The Global Times, a state-owned nationalist English publication stated: 
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“In face of the U.S. harassment, Beijing should deal with Washington tactfully and prepare for 
the worst. This can convince the White House that China, despite its unwillingness, is not 
frightened to fight a war with the US in the region, and is determined to safeguard its national 
interests and dignity,”84 
 
Publications like these are often dismissed in the US as nationalist bluster at the behest of CCP 
leaders. This dangerous oversimplification prevents the US from effective policy in the region 
which will lead to the resolution of the disputes and instead merely results in heightened 
tensions between the two powers, translating into the possibility of conflict. In fact, policy 
makers in Washington must realise that the party must respond decisively to maintain its 
mandate. Provocative and public the actions empower nationalist elements not only within the 
CCP but within society and result in a much more aggressive response than otherwise. This 
fundamental point seems to be missed as part of a wholesale misunderstanding of what drives 
policy formulations in the SCS disputes. 
 
 A lack of transparency of how policy is made in Beijing and a dismissal of Chinese 
nationalism as merely a tool used by the CCP 85  act as constraints on effective policy 
formulation in Washington. It effectively dismisses the agency of actors other than the CCP in 
policy making and fails to account for the interaction between society, the media, interest 
groups and the CCP. Lower penetration of mass media especially online allowed the party to 
maintain monopoly on information, giving propaganda officials time to create suitable 
narratives. This is no longer the case in China, where the spread social media along with 
smartphones and internet penetration force authorities to respond to events in real time, 
severely weakening the CCP’s monopoly on information. This misapprehension on the part of 
the previous Philippine administration and current policymakers in Washington have resulted 
in failed policies. Rather than allow Beijing to negotiate and compromise, the nature of these 
widely-publicised incidents have increased the number of policy entrepreneurs able to 
influence foreign policy. These agents would have previously been excluded from the 
policymaking process through state-framing. Their entrance has been facilitated by the public 
nature of the incidents and the policy responses which seem to dismiss the agency of Chinese 
society and deal with China as a unitary actor where policy is controlled only by the CCP.  
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The bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade provides a prominent example of the severity 
of the misunderstanding. The bombing resulted in large scare protests which were not 
contained to the mainland but included ‘Chinese across the globe spontaneously poured into 
the streets to protest.’86  The People’s Daily proclaimed “This is not 1899 China”87, in obvious 
reference to the era of unequal treaties and imperial incursion. The reaction was one of shock 
in US media, who ‘thought the Chinese people were not genuinely angry with America; rather, 
they were manipulated by Communist Party propaganda’88 including a delay in publishing 
NATOs apology until May 11th.89  This more than an oversimplification, it is a complete 
misreading of Chinese nationalism which treats Chinese as though they have no agency or role 
in their own identity. It also does not explain the overseas Chinese reaction including academics 
in North America who had access to US media.90 While the narrative of victimhood is taught 
as part of patriotic education in schools, and the party does indeed publish propaganda, it does 
not mean that it has a monopoly on the Chinese nationalist discourse, especially present day in 
the age of internet connectivity and social media.91 Indeed, there is now a sizeable number of 
popular nationalist figures which exert pressure on decision making and ‘the legitimacy of the 
current regime depends upon its ability to stay on top of popular nationalist demands.’92 It is 
precisely for this reason that Beijing seeks to use its power to censor and limit the publicity of 
sensitive issues, especially those likely to present potential conflicts as this allows a larger 
degree of freedom in policy making. The public stance taken by the Philippines with UNCLOS 
and by the US regarding freedom of navigation has resulted in a more assertive policy because 
the publicity of these policies has given power to policy entrepreneurs making it nearly 
impossible for Beijing to compromise without appearing to delegitimise itself. 
 Taking this into account it is not difficult to understand why the policies of the 
Philippines and the United States have failed to achieve their objectives. Instead they have been 
rather counterproductive, leading to heightened tensions and lower chances of finding a 
resolution. This important realisation should be taken on board both in Washington and Manila. 
Indeed, Manila seems to be closer to the realising that its policies have resulted in economic 
damage and no political or geostrategic gains. While, the disputes are likely to endure for the 
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foreseeable future but tensions and the chance of conflict can be lessened by taking a more 
low-key approach. This would provide Beijing with more room to negotiate given less publicity, 
and would likely be favoured by the CCP given its preference to ‘negotiate solutions with its 
neighbours.’93 
Taking Chinese Identity into Account in Policy Making 
 After analysing at the Philippine case along with US involvement, the current state of 
affairs characterised by high tensions is not irreversible. Moving beyond it requires an 
understanding of how the actions of foreign powers, especially the US are interpreted and play 
out in China. Gries tells us rightly that ‘the West is central to the construction of Chinese 
identity today’.94 The outcome is that the way that actions are interpreted directly reflects and 
shapes Chinese identity. The public challenges over the SCS disputes reinforce the narrative 
that the west seeks to keep China from rising and reinforces the legitimacy of the CCP as the 
saviour of the Chinese nation. Hence, the policies so far have coincided with the narrative of 
national humiliation as parallels can be drawn between the international system of now and 
that of a century ago in which the treaty of Nanjing was signed. Both instances dealt with the 
territorial sovereignty of China, the main difference is that China is now the second largest 
economy and has a modernising military. Making it unlikely that they will be forced to cede 
territory to foreign powers. As long as disputants attempt to use the international system or a 
legalistic approach rather than negotiations to resolve the disputes, they will be interpreted as 
attempts to constrain China. This is exacerbated every time that these disputes are widely 
publicised as they force the CCP to take more forceful measures than they would otherwise as 
they allow a greater number of policy entrepreneurs into the policymaking process. The views 
of these may be more nationalistic and be disseminated widely using social media and result in 
a more aggressive policy outcome.  
 Policy makers should acknowledge the agency of different sectors within Chinese 
society who have diverging interests not unlike their national populations. This will allow for 
a more balanced approach to initiatives that will be more responsive to how these sections of 
society would interpret them rather than making policy where the CCP is the only actor. 
Realising this will result in tweaking not only the policy but the approach and is more likely to 
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yield results since in spite of the portrayals in the media, it is unlikely that Beijing is actively 
looking for a confrontation.  
 The research has highlighted a clear way forward that can be applied to the SCS, the 
East China Sea disputes, and other foreign policy issues relating to territorial sovereignty. Its 
applicability is not universal and may not be used outside this realm. For example, it is unlikely 
this would apply to relations with China dealing with North Korean sanctions or with economic 
policy. This approach is most relevant in the area of territorial disputes given China’s history 
and the historical narrative of humiliation. This forces the CCP to respond to perceived 
aggression and defend the nation to maintain its legitimacy, whereas in other areas it can 
negotiate in a more direct way depending on its national interest. 
Practical Policy Implications Going Forward 
 There are three main drivers of how policy in the area will develop. They are the leaders 
of the states. Two, the presidents of the US and the Philippines were elected in 2016 and Xi 
Jinping is widely expected to be re-elected next year for a second term. Below the research will 
attempt to predict what this means for the disputes and the disputants. 
President Duterte and a Change of Policy 
 The election of a new president in the Philippines has already resulted in a significant 
policy shift with important implications for the dispute. Duterte has been critical of the US, 
promising that the Philippines would re-assess its relationship with the Washington.95 There is 
widespread concern that the result could be a new foreign policy stance which faces away from 
the US and towards China. Duterte’s signalling that it would prefer bilateral negotiations with 
Beijing rather than seek to pursue the implementation of the UNCLOS ruling was greeted very 
positively by the PRC. The chance of stance yielded a recent state visit which seems to have 
successfully led to the lowering of tensions and significant progress towards resuming normal 
relations. A joint statement highlighted the long bonds between both countries and committed 
both parties to working towards enhancing their friendship.96 Most important is point 40 of the 
joint statement which pertain to the SCS and states that China and the Philippines were 
committed to maintaining friendly relations and negotiating bilaterally.97 This de facto reset 
has in effect shelved the disputes for the time being and is reminiscent of agreements between 
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the PRC and the Philippines. By emphasising cooperation rather than conflict, the volte-face 
on the part of Manila has yielded tangible benefits, including the resumption of economic links 
in tourism and the import of agricultural products, both of which are significant to the 
Philippine economy. Duterte’s new stance has also benefited Beijing by lowering the level of 
publicity in the aftermath of the ruling. This allowed Beijing to exclude more extreme factions 
from the policy debate and therefore heightens the probability of reaching a modus vivendi. 
President Elect Donald Trump 
 US president elect Donald trump has already cause widespread concern in China by 
seeming to question the One China policy. Furthermore, he has mentioned the SCS conflict on 
Twitter messages,98forcing the CCP to respond to his bombastic claims and warning him of 
consequences if his attitude remains once he is in office.99 So far, the policy execution seems 
to be the exact opposite of what is needed to lower tensions in the region. The high visibility 
of his statements are counterproductive because they appeal to the nationalist elements in both 
the US and China, constraining the choices of both parties, and lessening the prospect for 
compromise. If this holds once he enters office, it is likely that there will be heightened tensions 
in the next four years. 
Xi Jinping’s Second Term 
 2017 marks the halfway point of Xi Jinping’s ten-year tenure as president. At this point, 
he has amassed a sizeable amount of power within the CCP, partly because of his anti-
corruption drive. His significance in his second term will come from two major factors; First, 
he will likely continue to define the parameters of the ‘Chinese dream’ and its evolution will 
define the impact it has on the evolution of Chinese identity. It is unlikely that this will result 
in a softening PRC’s stance on the disputes and given the nationalist aspects of the ‘Chinese 
dream’ may instead consolidate its position through a continued build up or the declaration of 
an air identification zone. Xi has made clear that it will ‘not allow anyone to infringe on China's 
sovereignty and related rights and interests in the South China Sea’ but rather than seek conflict 
he is committed to ‘manage disputes through institutionalized dialogue’.100 The second factor 
is US policy under incoming president Trump. Should Trump continue to publicly tweet 
messages criticizing Chinese policy on a variety of areas, it will empower hard-line elements 
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within the party as well as society. This would force Xi to adopt a more combative policy in 
response, lead to higher tensions, and lessen the opportunity for reaching an accord.   
Conclusion 
 It is easy to extrapolate the current tensions in the SCS into a bleak narrative of 
intractable conflict between various participants. This would be the wrong conclusion to reach 
given all the evidence examined. When considering the timeline of the conflict, it is key to 
remember that competing claims go back to the mid-20th century, but these did not become 
serious points of friction until much later. In the case of the Philippines, not until the 1990s101. 
They may seem intractable given the historical context, but do not present insurmountable 
challenges to any of the participants if they are truly motivated to do so. To do so, claimants 
must first achieve a better understanding of the PRC and how Chinese identity influences 
policy choices in Beijing. Lacking this insight has resulted in policies which have achieved 
nothing more than the escalation of tensions and elevating the risk of conflict. It must be clear 
that while this is an international law issue for some, a great power rivalry for others, it is a 
territorial integrity issue for many in the PRC. This last point must be taken seriously rather 
than dismissed outright as it holds the key to being able to negotiate its resolution. After all, 
issues related to the territorial integrity of a state arouse passion everywhere and it is precisely 
for this reason that solving them is especially difficult. China’s history of imperial incursions 
and unequal treaties makes understanding the effects of these events on the identity of modern 
China crucial to achieving consensus. As we have seen, it is this identity which is in constant 
interplay with both its perceptions of itself and others, and exerts influence through limiting 
the number of acceptable policies. While this interplay occurs in every state between its 
government and its citizens, it is eminent in the PRC where the ruling party relies on its 
historical narrative for a large part of its legitimacy. This limits its scope of action, but does not 
mean that it actively seeks conflict or that the disputes in the SCS are unconquerable. But their 
resolution is much more difficult without understanding the identity-policy relation that 
dominates foreign policy decision making in Beijing. Washington, Manila, and others ignore 
it at their own peril. 
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